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Introduction 
 
 
Support for Syria’s Civil Society – 
Misguided and Ineffective 
Without Military Action, International Support Will Continue to Be of No Avail 
Petra Becker 
Three-and-a-half years after the start of the peaceful protests in Syria the civil actors have 
been marginalised. The picture is dominated by a broad range of different militias. Few 
of them have a vision of Syria as a country based on pluralism and united in territorial, 
ethnic and denominational terms. Half of the population has fled abroad or has been 
displaced within the country. Millions of internal refugees are dependent on humanitar-
ian aid. In view of the international military campaign against the group which calls 
itself Islamic State, the Western supporters of the opposition urgently need to review 
their original strategy, which focused almost entirely on promoting civilian structures. 
 
When the uprising against the Assad regime 
began in 2011, civil actors were quick to 
band together in a whole range of initia-
tives. They were encouraged by the largely 
peaceful upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt 
and the declarations of support from West-
ern states such as the US and the Europe-
ans. Since then thousands of activists have 
been killed or imprisoned, or have fled 
abroad. The fact that there are still civil 
society groups trying to provide humanitar-
ian aid and preserve the infrastructure 
under such immensely difficult conditions 
says much about the resilience of Syrian 
society. While pursuing these goals they 
not only run the risk of being bombed by 
the regime or of being killed by the “Islamic 
State” (IS), but are also compelled to obey 
the dictates of the local militias. 
Tasks and Challenges 
The tasks and problems confronting civil-
ian actors differ depending on whether the 
areas concerned are under the control of 
the regime, the rebels, the Kurdish Demo-
cratic Union (PYD) or the IS. 
Areas under the Control of the Regime 
In the areas under the control of the regime 
– which range from Sweida in the southern-
most part of the country through Damascus 
and Homs to the coastal mountains – civil-
ian actors are primarily involved in humani-
tarian work. They are trying to help the 
internal refugees and provide them with 
clothes, food and medical assistance. Since 
the regime considers refugees who come 
from rebel-held areas to be terrorists, such 
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 humanitarian assistance is often a clandes-
tine affair. Anyone who is caught openly 
providing such assistance runs the risk of 
being arrested, tortured or murdered. This 
can happen even to workers of the Syrian 
Red Crescent. The same risks are incurred 
by organisers of workshops devoted to the 
peaceful coexistence of different denomina-
tions or to human rights. Nevertheless 
there continue to be undaunted activists 
who are willing to organise such events. 
Lawyers and volunteers document human 
rights abuses and provide assistance for 
political detainees and their families. A num-
ber of educators, psychologists and artists 
are trying to help traumatised children to 
forget about life in a war zone, at least now 
and then and for short periods of time. 
Rebel-held Areas 
These tasks are also being performed by 
civil groups in the rebel-held areas, above 
all in the southern province of Daraa, in 
the vicinity of Damascus and in the north-
western provinces of Aleppo and Idlib. But 
here the activists are having to shoulder the 
additional burden of civil administration. 
They are trying to keep the infrastructure 
(i.e. water mains, electricity grids and com-
munications networks) up and running, to 
supply the population with basic foodstuffs, 
cooking gas, and fuel for heating and trans-
portation purposes, and to provide educa-
tional facilities. For three years the people 
in these areas have been terrorised by Syr-
ian air strikes and Syrian artillery shelling. 
Thousands of activists have been killed, and 
many have been forced to flee. Those who 
have stayed usually find it very difficult to 
maintain their civil society activities, espe-
cially since it is now very difficult to feed 
one’s own family. Some people have become 
disillusioned and have joined the militias. 
The networks of the revolutionary “Local 
Coordination Committees” in Syria and 
similar associations which were all over the 
country in 2011 have started to crumble. 
Nonetheless a number of activists are carry-
ing on with their work. Ultimately, their 
success depends on the extent to which the 
various committees are networked with the 
opposition-in-exile and its various bodies, 
how much support they can mobilise from 
abroad, and whether the civil actors can 
work out a modus vivendi with dominant 
local rebel groups.  
Areas under PYD Control 
In the Kurdish-dominated areas in the north-
east of the country under the control of the 
PYD, where Kurdish self-rule was proclaimed 
early in 2014, civil society work has hither-
to been possible, though subject to certain 
restrictions. The PYD, the Syrian wing of 
the PKK, has adopted a strategy reminiscent 
of the one pursued by the Assad regime 
before the outbreak of the uprising. Such 
activities are integrated into and take place 
under the auspices of either the PYD or its 
mass organisations. Sometimes the inde-
pendent activists are initially given a free 
hand, and subsequently harassed and elimi-
nated if they become more influential. 
Areas under IS Control 
Since the IS was unable to take over the civil 
administration in Raqqa, the only sizeable 
town in Syria under its control, it has for 
the time being retained the opposition ad-
ministration and merely arrogated the 
areas of education and public order. This 
means that it can concentrate on indoctri-
nating the population, recruiting new 
fighters, and conquering other parts of the 
country. At the same time the IS brutally 
suppresses activities that seek to propagate 
democracy, pluralism or freedom of speech. 
Civil society actors have been arrested, 
abducted and executed. But even in these 
areas, there are still clandestine groups 
which do media work and document 
human rights abuses. 
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 International Assistance Ignores 
Basic Needs 
The international community, primarily 
through the UN, but also through numer-
ous private organisations, has provided 
assistance for Syria. However, on the whole 
this does not reach the places where it is 
needed, and is not enough to ensure the 
survival of the population and of civil 
society. 
Humanitarian Aid 
Humanitarian aid is still not reaching the 
rebel-held areas in sufficient quantities. In 
July 2014, the UN Security Council adopted 
Resolution 2165, which states that it is per-
missible to provide aid and supplies for 
such parts of the country without obtaining 
prior consent from the government. How-
ever, this decision does not solve the prob-
lem of the areas in the vicinity of Damascus 
and Homs where about half a million in-
habitants are besieged by forces loyal to the 
regime. A war economy has emerged. Rebel 
groups such as the “Islamic Army” do deals 
with mafioso members of the Syrian intel-
ligence services, smuggle foodstuffs into 
the besieged areas, and artificially keep 
goods in short supply in order to drive up 
the prices. Forces loyal to the regime extort 
food supplies from aid organisations and 
sell them on the black market. At the same 
time about 45,000 people in the north-west 
of Syria are besieged by rebel groups. 
Institutional Support and 
Capacity Building 
The international contact group “Friends of 
the Syrian People” supports the institution-
alisation of the opposition National Coali-
tion and its committees and of the Syrian 
Interim Government (SIG). There have been 
repeated complaints that these activities 
are being hampered by infighting within 
the opposition and by the latter’s flawed 
organisation. Although such criticism is 
certainly justified, it fails to address the 
central problem which is the fact that the 
“Friends of the Syrian People” lack a com-
mon strategy, the source of many of the 
internal conflicts. 
The aim of building up new structures 
requires a reliable budget. However, if only 
part of the promised financial resources is 
made available and not entirely disbursed 
via the National Coalition and the SIG, but 
actually more or less bypasses them, it is 
impossible to engage in structured work. 
This applies to supplies and provisions, to 
administration and infrastructure just as 
much as it does to the military assistance 
which was promised to the opposition. 
Instead of channelling this aid through the 
opposition’s Military Council, i.e. through 
the military wing of the coalition, such 
financial resources from a number of differ-
ent states – Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and even 
the US – still continue to be disbursed 
directly to various rebel groups and indi-
viduals within the opposition. This simply 
exacerbates the fragmentation of these 
organisations. 
At the same time the establishment of 
local structures continues to be torpedoed 
by the regime’s military activities. It is no 
doubt important to set up courses for civil 
actors in which, for example, they are 
trained to apply democratic procedures, to 
do media work, or to provide psychological 
support to children. However, they will not 
do much good as long as children continue 
to be the victims of air strikes, and as long 
as it proves impossible to establish demo-
cratic structures because interests, even on 
the local level, are no longer the subject of 
negotiations but are asserted with armed 
force. 
Infrastructure Issues 
The same is true of the aid provided by 
international organisations that is designed 
to preserve and to repair the infrastructure 
in the rebel-held areas. The city of Aleppo 
provides an example of how municipal 
workers unceasingly repair water mains 
and waste water drains that have been 
destroyed by air strikes, even while in other 
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 places the systems are being hit and dam-
aged on a daily basis. Elsewhere in the 
provinces of Aleppo and Idlib it can safely 
be said that reports about the successful 
completion of projects inevitably lead to 
new bombing runs. The regime’s strategy is 
obvious. It is unwilling to accept a normali-
sation of life in the rebel-held areas, since 
this would facilitate the emergence of a 
political alternative. In view of the repeated 
setbacks associated with ”construction 
work” of this kind, some international or-
ganisations have terminated their support 
because they believe that lasting improve-
ments cannot be made under the present 
circumstances. 
The military chaos also hampers activi-
ties in the rebel-held areas. Thus activists 
have reported instances in which newly 
procured ambulances have been requisi-
tioned by the rebels and re-equipped as 
combat vehicles. In April 2014 the head of 
the civilian council of the town of Saraqeb 
was abducted by rebels and maltreated for 
days. The council had received a large sum 
of money earmarked for infrastructure 
projects, and the rebels wanted to extort 
some of this for themselves. 
Comprehensive Strategy Required 
For more than three years the supporters 
of the opposition in general and the US in 
particular have excluded the idea of direct 
military intervention in Syria. In doing so 
they have succumbed to the illusion that, 
even if the conflict could not be resolved 
at the negotiating table, it could at least 
be confined to Syria. The territorial gains 
made by the IS has shown that they were 
wrong. Today, a tenuous coalition under 
American leadership is conducting air 
strikes against the IS and other radical 
groups, and there is a heated debate going 
on about the deployment of ground troops. 
However, it is unclear how this might help 
to resolve the basic conflict. In order to com-
bat the IS and to alleviate the pressure on 
neighbouring states of the never-ending 
waves of refugees, there is in fact a need for 
military action. However, this must be em-
bedded in a more comprehensive approach 
containing two key elements: 
 First, the imposition of a no-fly zone over 
the whole of Syria in order to afford pro-
tection to the civilian population against 
air attacks by the regime. Now that the 
US-led coalition has relinquished its 
policy of military restraint, it should 
focus on this type of protection. At the 
same time this could facilitate the start 
of ceasefire negotiations and pave the 
way for a political solution. The regime 
will only participate in meaningful talks 
if it is under massive pressure in military 
terms. And the vast majority of the 
rebels will probably give their assent to 
a negotiated settlement if they receive 
assurances that the inner circle around 
Assad will be excluded from any transi-
tional arrangement. For the fact is that 
the rebels are just as war-weary as the 
people around them. 
 Second, the establishment of a fund under 
the control of the “Friends of the Syrian 
People” which will be used to finance the 
interim government and the Syrian Mili-
tary Council. An external supervisory 
committee should monitor these finan-
cial resources to ensure administrative 
transparency. 
These two measures could help to stabilise 
the situation in the rebel-held areas and 
give the civil actors more room for manoeu-
vre. It would also send out a signal to the 
people in the areas under the control of the 
regime. The seizure of the Al-Tabqa military 
airbase at the end of August 2014, where 
hundreds of soldiers loyal to the regime 
were executed by the IS, has seriously weak-
ened confidence in the Assad leadership, 
even among its own supporters. What these 
people need in order to escape from the 
regime’s “It’s us or the terrorists” strategy is 
a credible alternative. However, this is not 
going to materialise anytime soon if the 
violence in the rebel-held areas persists and 
the population becomes increasingly radi-
calized as a result. 
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